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Abstract: The process of ‘labelling’ (whereby labels are socially imposed 
on a given behaviour by a given person) is an extensive and recurrent one 
in our society, as proved by the labelling of behaviours and people even 
into the literary text. In our analysis, we will try to show how applying one 
of two most different labels (psychopathic or psychotic) greatly influences 
our understanding of the existence of ‘evil’ or moral responsibility in the 
deeds of a person. To such end, we will use Peter Shaffer’s play Equus 
(1973), which requires both the characters in the play and the spectators to 
decide whether Alan Strang’s terrible crime is a result of evil or of insane 
behaviour: whether he is ‘mad’ or simply ‘bad’. We will try to evince the 
current social and cultural confusion between madness and evil, and how 
processes of medicalization or criminalization affect our understanding of 
those around us and those living in the books we read. 
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When first staged, Equus (1973) by Peter Shaffer provoked 
heated reactions not only in literary and dramatic circles, but also in the 
psychiatric community that the play both presents and questions. Much of 
the interest, comments and controversies raised by the play are focused on 
the blurred frontiers it proposes between sanity and madness, between 
mad and evil behaviour. Considered to be an apology of violence by some, 
the spectator is never completely assured of what the reasons behind Alan 
Strang’s violent act are (if there are any). Also, the representation of 
violence is offered to the spectator directly, what produces a non-mediated 
cathartic and visceral reaction, which would be somehow diluted in a 
written, not staged, work.  
In the stage (which is, alternatively, a boxing room, an operating 
room, a court, and an altar), two opposite views are presented: to some, 
Alan is deeply disturbed and in need of a ‘cure’ (the view fostered by 
Alan’s psychiatrist, Martin Dysart and his colleague, Hesther Salomon). 
To others, his cruel act can only be explained by an evil personality (as 
argued by Harry Dalton, the stable owner, and the bench of lawyers 
judging the case). Shaffer himself, in the prologue to Equus, makes 
reference to the real-life incident that inspired the work, committed by “a 
highly disturbed young man” and lacking “any coherent explanation”1  
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The play becomes an argument around the ulterior motives (or lack of) of 
Alan Strang: is he evil or mad? Is he affected by a psychotic disorder or 
plainly sociopathic? In the following pages, we will try to delimitate 
psychosis and psychopathy, analysing the processes at work in society for 
labelling or mislabelling these different behaviours and the way they are 
reflected in literature, specifically in Equus. 
Penning from Hamlet, if Alan’s be madness there is certainly no 
method to it. The criminal act itself (the blinding of the horses) is 
markedly violent, due to the built tension of the play, and Alan’s 
behaviour is deeply tainted with aggressiveness, hence the pathology in 
the case. For those arguing for the ‘insanity’ of his behaviour, the boy has 
been diagnosed (both inside and outside the dramatic world of the play) as 
a schizophrenic. Serious misconceptions of what schizophrenia is (as we 
will analyse later) are deeply rooted in the social unconscious: this 
archetypal form of insanity, however, does not imply a sort of Jekyll and 
Hide ‘split’ personality. It is, rather, the contrary to a split: fantasy and 
reality are seen as one, and events happening in the fantasy world of the 
mind are treated as though they were taking place in the real world. The 
schizophrenic does not ‘become’ nor is ‘taken over’ by someone else, but 
rather is always insecure about who s/he is, because of his/her inability to 
discriminate fantasy and reality. Schizophrenics are not ‘possessed’ by an 
alternate personality that makes them act violently, another common 
misconception that is related to a social construct of schizophrenia, and 
while some do commit violent acts (in a much less significant statistical 
probability than is usually thought), most spurts of violence by alleged 
schizophrenics are, in fact, produced by individuals with sociopathic or 
psychopathic tendencies who are taken to be, or pretend to be, mad. 
People diagnosed with schizophrenia are more likely to hurt themselves or 
those immediately around them (close family) than to tend to outbursts of 
uncontrollable violence and anger. 
In this sense, Alan’s attitude and behaviour is presented at times 
to be tainted with marked sociopathic hues, since the horses he blinds 
represent society at large (the actors in the chorus appear, alternatively, as 
the horses, as main characters in the play, and as a social force and crowd 
which is never fully identified). 2 Faced with the appalling and apparently 
senseless violence of the deed, societal forces at large plunge into a search 
for reasons: many critics have seen Equus as a ‘whodunit’ with a 
psychiatric background, as a detective story not in the sense of finding out 
who the criminal is, but of clarifying what the reasons behind the crime 
could be, an interpretation where the raison d’être of the staging would be 
to find out what could be the reasoning (or lack of) in an apparently 
normal adolescent’s mind who brutally blinds innocent animals. This 
reduction of Equus to a whodunit is, clearly, a very simplistic one that 
ignores many other aspects at work within the play (the opposition 
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between reason and passion, the consequences of desperate religiousness, 
the conflicts of adolescence and the contradictions in familiar upbringing, 
to name but a few), but it does emphasize the point we intend to make: 
Alan Strang could not be considered to be an ‘evil’ person, but he is, 
rather, deeply psychologically disturbed due to a series of societal 
pressures that have eroded his possibilities for normal development during 
his childhood and adolescence.  
According to Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, the “vocabulary 
of denigration” at work in the diagnosis or ‘labelling’ of schizophrenia 
implies the existence of “a certain standard way of being human to which 
the psychotic cannot measure up”, the result of “efforts to avoid thinking 
in terms of freedom, choice, responsibility”. 3 Labelling as a theory was 
introduced by a group of sociologists (Howard Becker, John Kitsuse and 
Kai Erikson) in the 60s (roughly the same decade when Laing’s theories 
about the schizophrenic division of the self were first presented). To this 
group, deviance is a process of symbolic interaction, i.e., a person being 
labelled requires the existence of a labeller. The interaction between both 
(labelled and labeller) would be ruled by their interpretation of the other’s 
actions and reactions. We find this theory to be most pertinent in our 
analysis of Equus, since the mere exercise of labelling Alan Strang a 
psychotic or a psychopath deeply influences the way his actions are 
analysed. Furthermore, “once people are labelled deviant, they tend to see 
themselves as deviant, which in turn leads them to continue the so-called 
deviant behaviour”. 4 Labelling, in all its forms, would always be applied 
by the majority, i.e. by society itself: Alan’s clearly deviant behaviour is 
explained in some parts of Equus as a result of a revenge on the 
institutions that are at the basis of society, such as family or religion, 
understanding said institutions as fictive constructs which are created to 
direct and monitor the individual. Shaffer reflects on how the strains of 
education affect individuals, specifically in families such as Alan’s, a 
teenager and only child undergoing “the torment of adolescence” and 
embarked in the definition of his self and identity.5
The cruel torture act towards the horses unveils the contradictions 
and fissures that are at work in Alan’s mind, as well as the reality of his 
family and the contradictory communicative modes and manipulations 
that have been placed on Alan during his development. The idea of the 
family as an entity where the members should be co-ordinated for the 
correct development of the individual is one that seems to haunt Shaffer: 
Five Finger Exercise (1958) likens a family to the fingers in a pianist’s 
hand, which have to be perfectly in tune so as to play successfully. As 
opposed to this tuning, Alan has been manipulated by his parents, who 
have been sending contradictory messages in terms of religion, politics, 
and morality, while also reinforcing Alan’s desperate religiosity. Alan 
becomes the battleground where the fights of their incompatible parents 
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are staged, as both Dora and Frank Strang fight to control Alan’s self and 
try to make him approve their own vision of the world, to affirm their 
position versus the other. Marriage is, for Shaffer, a social institution that 
allows no questioning, a hypocritical agreement by which only society as 
an institution is satisfied, and which does not lead to a balanced education 
of the children: “A box of boredom for man and wife – a torture chamber 
for the children . . . a miserable little group marked off by a flat door, or a 
garden fence”.6
Since it would be unfair for Shaffer to put the blame for the crime 
on family alone, it must be noticed that the family is seen as a microcosm 
reflecting the larger societal pressures on the individual. Television is one 
of the means Alan uses, through the endless repetition of jingles and 
commercials, to denounce the manipulation he’s being subjected to, and to 
emphasize how the experiences that enable individual development are 
channelled by mass media towards manipulated stereotypes, as seen in Act 
I, scene iii. Identity is a social construction, a failed one in this case, just 
as evil seems to be presented as socially constructed. Laing describes, in 
The Divided Self, the evolution from a: 
 
good, normal, healthy child . . . to be bad, to do or say 
things that . . . [caused] great distress and which . . . [are] 
on the whole ‘put down’ to naughtiness or badness until 
. . . [it goes] beyond all tolerable limits so that . . . [the 
person can] only be regarded as completely mad”. 7  
 
This formulation, which has become a classic one in the shape of 
the ‘from bad to mad’ formula, marks the confusion at work in society’s 
collective mind between schizophrenia and personality disorder, where the 
only way to cope with an appalling crime is to attribute it to some non-
understandable force, to pure madness, instead of pure evil. Dalton, the 
stable owner in Equus, considers that Alan was, at first “bloody good. 
He’d spend hours with the horses cleaning and grooming them, way over 
the call of duty. I thought he was a real find”. Only after the blinding has 
taken place he realizes he “had been hiring a loony.”8  
The idea that madness might be a physical illness requiring 
medical treatment started at the beginning of the 17th c., when aristocratic 
families started to pack up embarrassing, crazy relatives, sending them to 
private madhouses that took prisons as a model of surveillance and control 
of difference as analysed by Michel Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic, 
Discipline and Punish, Madness and Civilization and Mental Illness and 
Psychology.  
In general terms, it is by no means exaggerated to say that our 
culture associates madness with evil, and that the boundaries between 
character defect (psychopathy, sociopathy) and psychiatric illness are 
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more blurred now than ever. There is a confusion in the mind of the 
average individual between schizophrenia and personality disorders, 
between people who have mental problems and those who are antisocial or 
immature. 9 This confusion is the result of a long and intricate process of 
medicalization and criminalization, and it is, in part, the result of a 
confusion whereby notorious (and not necessarily mentally ill) criminals 
are sent to psychiatric hospital or units, instead of being sent to plain 
prisons. Contrarily, Alan Strang was going to be sent to prison, as Hesther 
informs the spectators: “My bench wanted to send the boy to prison. For 
life, if they could manage it. It took me two hours solid arguing to get him 
sent to you [psychiatrist Martin Dysart] instead.” 10 In the common 
imagination, the frontier between medical care and penitentiary 
confinement is not quite clear. In the United Kingdom, some controversial 
sections of the 1983 Mental Health Act allow courts to send some kind of 
deviant social misfits (such as sex offenders or arsonists) to psychiatric 
hospitals. Furthermore, psychologists and psychiatrists in said hospitals 
use medical models to deal with such offenders, so the identification 
between ‘mad’ and ‘bad’ is perpetuated. 
There are some other reasons for society at large to identify 
madness and badness: the media often use the term ‘psychopath’ and 
‘psychotic’ as if they were interchangeable. While the term ‘psychopath’ 
is clearly falling into disuse (precisely because of its confusion with terms 
such as ‘psychosis’), many deeds committed by psychopathic individuals 
tend to be termed ‘psychotic’, thus extending the identification between 
both terms. To further complicate things, psychopathic criminals, who 
tend to be extremely cunning, manipulative and clear-thinking, often 
simulate psychotic symptoms to achieve lenient charges and to satisfy 
their mendacity by deceiving both courts and psychiatrists alike. Well-
known offenders have claimed to suffer symptoms commonly associated 
with schizophrenia (hearing voices, multiple personalities) and have often 
been successful in conning doctors and juries to receive mental health 
care: in fact, many text-books on criminology still consider David 
Berkowitz, the infamous Son of Sam (agreed to be a sane sociopath and 
serial killer), to be a clear example of schizophrenia.  
These examples should account for the common tendency to 
consider anyone whose behaviour is seen as amoral, dangerous or 
outrageous as ‘mad’. Human mind and society finds something 
comforting in the fact that a serious criminal offence, a murder or any 
brutal act, has been produced under the influence of a psychosis, rather 
than acknowledging the fact that sane people who would not be given a 
psychiatric diagnose may act so brutally. While the personality of the 
psychopath or sociopath is clearly abnormal and may be related to a defect 
in character, this does not imply the existence of any mental illness. The 
‘medicalization’ of clearly selfish or anti-social behaviours is reinforcing 
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the identification between dangerous individuals and mental patients. 
Many are convinced that serial killers, terrorists, or even child-molesters 
must be mentally ill to do what they do. In the words of Muijen, “An 
ominous process is developing in many people’s minds, linking evil and 
mental illness”. 11 The automatic connection between violence and mental 
illness is thus bolstered.  
We could say that punishment in our society is based on the 
belief that, in order for an act of violence or cruelty to be considered a 
crime, it must be committed by someone who has freely chosen to act that 
way: punishment, therefore, presupposes rationality, sanity, and freedom 
of choice. To further complicate the identification between madness and 
badness, the treatment of both in western civilization has been virtually 
the same. In Laingian terms, madness is often interpreted as another form 
of disobedience or disregard for the norms, as is badness: therefore, 
society has often tended to consider that both deviances can be treated 
through similar punitive systems. While the idea of what is criminal but 
sane and what is insane behaviour seems to be clear in legal texts, from 
the Durham Rule (“An accused is not criminally responsible if his 
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect”, Durham vs. US 
1954) to the Insanity Defence Reform Act [US 1984], whereby a person 
charged with a criminal offence should be found not guilty by reason of 
insanity if it is shown that, as a result of a mental disease or retardation, he 
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of his 
offence, the pretence of madness on the part of some notorious criminals 
have caused a general distrust of the badness/madness distinction. On the 
other hand, while the definition of madness is complicated by the 
unfathomability of the brain and the little knowledge we still have of 
mental processes; badness, even if not formally diagnosed, can be 
recognized when we see it. As expressed by Satel, “one of the hallmarks 
of badness (or evil, as some might call it) is the lack of ambivalence that 
the perpetrators feel towards their actions”. 12 This is clearly not the case 
in Equus, where the plot slowly unveils the many contradictory feelings 
Alan places on the horses he blinds: fear, awe, submission, or hate, and the 
corresponding ambivalence in his perception of what he has done. 
“Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder” (DSPD), also called 
“Antisocial Personality” in DSM-IV (a wide term that would include both 
sociopathy and psychopathy) makes reference to a sane, but amoral and 
selfish person who has no conscience or feelings for others, and who is 
likely to disrespect and violate norms with no feelings of regret or guilt for 
such actions.13 If we take paedophilia as an example (a criminal, deviant 
behaviour which has often been considered by most of society to be the 
result of a ‘mad’ or ‘sick’ behaviour), we can say that, even if there is a 
disorder in their sexual orientation, the paedophiles do have moral choices 
available, which in this case would include inhibition of sexual practice 
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and not coercing others into said type of sex. Sexual orientations, deviant 
as they may be, are not illnesses per se, since their negative or deviant 
results can be morally questioned and avoided by the individual before the 
sexual act takes place. As far as Personality Disorders are concerned, 
some authors such as Linda Steele have expressed doubts that they can be 
‘cured’: personality grows over the length of one’s life and could not, 
therefore, be ‘treated’ by psychiatrists. These authors point at the failure of 
the ‘medical’ paradigm for the treatment of sociopaths and psychopaths, 
and emphasize that the misrepresentation of criminality as mental illness 
does not stress the idea of moral responsibility.  
Individuals diagnosed as suffering “antisocial personality 
disorder” tend to be apparently well adjusted in society, often charming 
and intelligent. These apparently positive qualities are combined with a 
tendency towards cunningness and manipulation, insincerity and lack of 
remorse, and a certain emotional shallowness reflected in their lack of 
empathy and in a different threshold for fear and anxiety, higher than the 
average individual. Though they often despise social order and their peers, 
the sociopaths are able to function perfectly within the society they 
despise, simulating a perfect adaptation to their surroundings. Sociopaths 
and psychopaths do not lose touch with reality (although they often have 
feelings of superiority) and very rarely suffer anguish or distress. The 
mentally ill, on the contrary, tend to withdraw socially and to avoid 
interaction with others, because of their inability to inscribe themselves in 
reality and to clearly set the difference between reality and fantasy: the 
psychopath is inscribed in reality while the psychotic is very loosely 
connected to the real world. The psychotic also usually share mainstream 
social values, and thus are deeply disturbed and distressed whenever they 
break social expectations or norms: in this sense, Alan in Equus is deeply 
worried whenever he strays from what he has been taught by his parents 
(when he is caught at a pornographic movie house, for example), and is 
horrified when he remembers, through a faked session of hypnosis, what 
happened at the stable. Alan’s horrible crime is not the result of disregard 
for social norms, but rather the expression of a deeply disturbed 
introjection of social norms, produced by a convoluted development as an 
individual.  
The subject for this paper sprouts from the deep confusion in 
society’s collective mind of what is bad and what is mad, with the 
expectable result that evil or badness tends to be devoid of its moral 
component and ‘excused’ as madness and irrationality. Our analysis of the 
forces at work in Equus should be considered within an expected 
continuum of research that tries to delimitate what is evil and what is 
insanity in literature. Literary works and films are a reliable reflection of 
most general assumptions of society: in this sense, during the last 20 
years, readers and spectators seem to have been obsessed with works that 
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portray antisocial criminal behaviours identified as insane or which at 
least do not establish a clear differentiation between evil and insanity (the 
almost archetypal Hannibal Lecter created by Thomas Harris in The 
Silence of the Lambs would be a clear example of this tendency: when 
asked what is wrong with him, most people answer he is suffering some 
mental disorder, and many identify him as a ‘schizophrenic’). While some 
literary works, such as A Clockwork Orange by Anthony Burgess, or The 
Lord of the Flies by William Golding, clearly show the consequences of 
evil antisocial behaviour without establishing any link to mental disorders, 
it is most interesting to analyse the reader’s reactions towards some other 
works or films where psychopaths are equated with psychotics. In the long 
run, we attempt to try and detect a pattern in the literary representation of 
evil and its association with (or dissociation from) madness. Equus is a 
pioneer, in this sense, in the exploration of the modern obsession with 
‘evil madmen’ and in its restless exploration of what the borders of 
insanity and evil are.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Peter Shaffer, Equus. (Hardmonsworth: Penguin, 1985), 8. 
2. Sydney Lumet’s 1977 adaptation employs real horses instead of 
actors disguised as such: as a result, much of the strength of the 
implication in the society-horses equation is lost. 
3. Ronald David Laing, The Divided Self: an Existential Study in Sanity 
and Madness (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 27. 
4. Alex Thio, Deviant Behaviour (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 
56. 
5. Barry Pree, “Peter Shaffer Interviewed by Barry Pree,” Transatlantic 
Review 14 (1963): 92. 
6. Peter Shaffer, Shrivings: a Play in Three Acts. (London: Deutsch, 
1974), 147. 
7. Laing, 181. 
8. Peter Shaffer, Equus. (Hardmonsworth: Penguin, 1985), 47. 
9. J. Leff, “Why is Care in the Community Perceived as a Failure?,” 
British Journal of Psychiatry 179 (2001): 381. 
10. Shaffer, 19. 
11. M. Muijen, “Everyone’s Favourite Scapegoat,” Health Service 
Journal 12 (1996): 16. 
12. Sally Satel, “Perspective on Hate; Badness or Madness? Furrow 
Sought Help For What He Saw As His Mental Illness. We Don't 
Know If He Was Delusional Or Evil,” The Los Angeles Times, 15 
August 1999, p. 5. 
13. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published 
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by the American Psychiatric Association, is the handbook used most 
often in diagnosing mental disorders in the United States. While 
widely accepted among psychologists and psychiatrists, the manual 
has proved controversial in its listing of certain characteristics as 
mental disorders, the most notorious example being the listing in the 
DSM-II of homosexuality as a mental disorder; a classification that 
was removed by vote of the APA in 1973. In 2000 the American 
Psychiatric Association revised the text of DSM-IV to include new 
research information that had been developed since first publication in 
1994. This text revision (TR) included a very few changes in the 
criteria, designed mainly to correct what were perceived as errors in 
the original text.  
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